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NOTICE, DUE PROCESS, AND VOTER
REGISTRATION PURGES
ANTHONY J. GAUGHAN**
ABSTRACT
In the 2018 case of Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, a divided United States
Supreme Court upheld the procedures that Ohio election authorities used to purge
ineligible voters from the state’s registration lists. In a 5-4 ruling, the majority ruled
that the Ohio law complied with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993
(“NVRA”) as amended by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”). This
Article contends that the controlling federal law—the NVRA and the HAVA—gave
the Supreme Court little choice but to decide the case in favor of Ohio’s secretary of
state. But this article also argues that the Ohio procedure fails to constitute good public
policy even though it complies with federal law. Accordingly, this Article concludes
with a set of modest proposals for reforming the notification process used in list
maintenance procedures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most controversial rulings of the 2017–18 Supreme Court term was
Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute.1 In a 5-4 decision, the Court’s conservative
majority upheld an Ohio election statute that establishes the State’s procedure for
identifying and removing ineligible voters from the State’s voting rolls.2 The statute’s
challengers claimed that the Ohio list maintenance procedure—known as the
“Supplemental Process”—purged thousands of eligible voters in violation of the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”) as amended by the Help America
*

Professor of Law, Drake University Law School; J.D. Harvard Law School, 2005;
Ph.D. (history) University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2002.
1 138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018); see also Jeffrey Toobin, The Supreme Court’s Husted Decision
Will Make It More Difficult for Democrats to Vote, THE NEW YORKER (June 11, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-supreme-courts-husted-decision-willmake-it-more-difficult-for-democrats-to-vote (arguing that the Husted decision will be viewed
as a tool to purge “disfavored voters” from state voting rolls).

Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1848 (“We have no authority to second-guess Congress or to decide
whether Ohio’s Supplemental Process is the ideal method for keeping its voting rolls up to date.
The only question before us is whether it violates federal law. It does not.”).
2
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Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”). 3 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the
Supplemental Process complied with the NVRA. 4
Many media commentators and Democratic politicians condemned the Husted
decision and accused the conservative majority of aiding and abetting voter
disenfranchisement. For example, Jeffrey Toobin of the New Yorker asserted that the
Husted “ruling is bad enough on its own terms, but what makes Justice Samuel Alito’s
opinion so chilling is the way that it invites other states” to adopt Ohio’s “antidemocratic practice” of purging “less-frequent voters from its rolls.”5 Mark Joseph
Stern of Slate declared the ruling “a nightmare scenario for voting-rights advocates.”6
Garrett Epps of the Atlantic predicted that the Husted ruling would aid the Republican
Party and undermine the Democratic Party by facilitating the disenfranchisement of
poor and minority voters.7 Likewise, Democratic Congressman Tim Ryan warned that
“[w]ith this decision, Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted and states across the country
were given the all clear to silence American voters.”8
This Article analyzes the Husted decision, and in the process, makes three central
points. First, this Article contends that the controlling federal law—the NVRA (as
amended by HAVA)—gave the Supreme Court little choice but to rule in favor of
Ohio. The central question in Husted was straightforward: Does the NVRA permit
states to use non-voting as a basis for identifying voters who may have moved out of
state or out of their local voting jurisdiction? The Ohio law at issue in Husted used
non-voting as a trigger event for the State’s list maintenance procedure. When a
registered voter failed to participate in any election activity over a two-year period,
Ohio law directed that such voters receive a postcard notification from state election
officials asking the voter to confirm their address. If the voter failed to respond to the
address-confirmation notification, and also failed to vote in any election in the
subsequent four years, election authorities removed the voter from the State’s voter
registration list.
In contesting Ohio’s law, the challengers argued that the NVRA entirely barred
states from using non-voting as the trigger for beginning the list maintenance process. 9
3 Id. at 1841 (“A pair of advocacy groups and an Ohio resident (respondents here) think
that Ohio’s Supplemental Process violates the NVRA and HAVA.”).
4

Id. at 1848.

5

Toobin, supra note 1.

6 Mark Joseph Stern, Supreme Court, in 5–4 Decision, Allows States to Purge Voters for
Their Failure to Vote, SLATE (June 11, 2018), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2018/06/supreme-court-greenlights-ohio-voter-purges-in-husted-v-randolph.html.
7 Garrett Epps, The Supreme Court Blesses Voter Purges, THE ATLANTIC (June 12, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/the-supreme-court-blesses-voterpurges/562589/ (“The predictable result is that many Ohioans who should vote will not be
allowed to; the other equally predictable result is that a disproportionate number of them will
be poor or members of minority communities. The third predictable result is that
disfranchisement of those voters will aid the Republican Party and disadvantage their
opposition, the Democrats.”).
8 Tim Ryan, Supreme Court Ruling on Voter Roll Purge Undermines the Right to Vote,
THE HILL (June 12, 2018), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/391900-supremecourt-ruling-on-voter-roll-purge-undermines-the-right-to.
9

Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1845 (2018).
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The four dissenting justices in Husted agreed with the challengers.10 The dissenters
asserted that the NVRA bars state election authorities from using non-voting as one
of the criteria for determining when an address confirmation notice should be sent to
voters.11
But both the challengers, as well as the dissent, read more into the NVRA’s
language than the text would support. As the majority rightly pointed out, the NVRA
only establishes bare minimum requirements for states to abide by when identifying
ineligible voters.12 Indeed, when Congress amended the NVRA with the HAVA in
2002, it added language that expressly barred states from using non-voting as the sole
basis for purging voter registrations. 13 Consequently, the most logical interpretation of
the NVRA’s text was that it permitted the use of non-voting as a basis for
implementing the list maintenance process, but not as the sole basis for removing a
voter from registration lists. In the end, the majority’s reading of the statute simply
made more sense than the strained interpretation offered by the dissent.
Nevertheless, this Article also argues that the Ohio voter-purging procedure fails
to constitute good public policy even though it complies with the NVRA. The bottom
line is the NVRA does not hold states to a high enough standard in warning voters of
the potential cancellation of their registration. It may have been reasonable in the
1990s for Congress to only require states to send a single address confirmation notice
via U.S. Mail, but a quarter-century later such minimal notice is no longer adequate.
The rise of email has reduced the importance of U.S. Mail in most voters’ lives, and
the concomitant increase in junk mail has increased the risk that voters will
inadvertently ignore a single postcard from state election authorities.
This Article’s third and final point consists of a modest set of proposals to remedy
the NVRA’s inadequacies. Foremost among them, Congress should amend the NVRA
to require states to provide more notice to voters before removing them from
registration rolls. Congress should also require the states to offer same-day registration
in federal elections. At present, only a minority of states have adopted same-day
registration, which means there is no fallback relief for most voters around the country
victimized by overly aggressive voter registration purges. But until same-day
registration becomes a reality nationwide, future plaintiffs in cases like Husted should
consider bringing claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
When election authorities strike a voter from the registration rolls without providing
adequate notice, the state violates the voter’s right to due process. Thus, a due process
claim may afford voters relief in cases like Husted where the plain language of the
NVRA otherwise fails to protect disenfranchised voters.

10

Id. at 1850 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

11

Id.

12

Id. at 1847 (majority opinion).

13

Id. at 1844.
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II. THE NVRA AND THE OHIO SUPPLEMENTAL PROCESS
Historically, states routinely removed voters from registration rolls for the sole
reason that the voters had failed to vote in recent elections.14 In some cases, states even
failed to provide prior notice to voters before striking them from the rolls.15
Concerned by the impact on federal elections, Congress took a much more active
role in supervising the states’ administration of voter registration lists in the early
1990s.16 Acting pursuant to its authority under the Elections Clause, 17 Congress
enacted the National Voter Registration Act in 1993.18 The NVRA had two main
objectives.19 The first was to make “it easier for all Americans to register to vote.”20
The “Motor Voter Law,” as the NVRA has come to be known, requires states to give
qualified voters the opportunity to register to vote when applying for or renewing their
drivers’ licenses.21 The NVRA’s effort to increase voter registration succeeded almost
immediately. In 1996—just three years after the law’s adoption—the percentage of
registered voters reached 72%, the highest percentage ever recorded.22 By 2012, voter
registration nationwide had increased by 7% from the 1990s. 23
Besides increasing voter registration, Congress also had a second objective in
enacting the NVRA: encouraging the states to update and modernize their voting rolls.
To that end, the NVRA requires the states to maintain up-to-date voter registration
14 Id. at 1845 (describing “the once-common state practice of removing registered voters
simply because they failed to vote for some period of time.”).
15 Id. at 1838 (“Before the NVRA, some States removed registrants without giving any
notice”).
16

Id. at 1850–51.

The Elections Clause provides that: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places
of chusing Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
17

18

Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1850–51 (Thomas, J., concurring).

Id. at 1838 (majority opinion) (“The Act has two main objectives: increasing voter
registration and removing ineligible persons from the States’ voter registration rolls.”).
19

20 Id.; see also About the National Voter Registration Act, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-national-voter-registration-act#1993 (last visited Mar. 10,
2019) (“The Act has made it easier for all Americans to register to vote and to maintain their
registration.”).
21 52 U.S.C. § 20504(a)(1) (2012) (“Each State motor vehicle driver’s license application
(including any renewal application) submitted to the appropriate State motor vehicle authority
under State law shall serve as an application for voter registration with respect to elections for
Federal office unless the applicant fails to sign the voter registration application.”).
22 The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of
Federal
Elections,
FEDERAL
ELECTION
COMM’N
(June
1997), https://www.fec.gov/about/reports-about-fec/agency-operations/impact-national-voterregistration-act-1993-administration-federal-elections-html/.
23 ROYCE CROCKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40609, THE NATIONAL VOTER
REGISTRATION ACT OF 1993: HISTORY, IMPLEMENTATION, AND EFFECTS 23 (Sept. 18, 2013),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40609.pdf.
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lists by removing ineligible voters from their rolls. 24 The NVRA specifically mandates
that each state “conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove
the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters.” 25
The NVRA’s concern with up-to-date registration lists reflected Congress’s
awareness that Americans frequently move out of their voting jurisdictions. About
forty million Americans change addresses each year,26 a number so large it means that
state voter registration rolls routinely become outdated with each new election cycle.
For example, a 2012 Pew Center on the States study found that about twenty-four
million voter registrations are either “no longer valid or significantly inaccurate.” 27
The Pew study underscored the disorganized and underfunded nature of the voter
registration system in the United States.28
The NVRA sought to end that haphazard process by establishing minimum
national standards for the states in cleaning up their voting rolls. 29 To modernize the
system, the NVRA directs the states to cancel a voter’s registration if the registrant
“confirms in writing that the registrant has changed residence to a place outside the
registrar’s jurisdiction.”30 The written notification described in the NVRA usually
consists of the voter’s submission of an “Official USPS Change of Address” form,
which is available online.31 Approximately 60% of people who move notify the U.S.
Postal Service of their address change, 32 and some estimates put the number as high
as 70%.33
The Postal Service notification system thus enables state election authorities to
identify a majority of voters who change addresses.34 But because 30% to 40% of
24 Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1838 (“The Act has two main objectives: increasing voter
registration and removing ineligible persons from the States’ voter registration rolls.”).
25

52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4) (2012).

26 Michael Sauter, Population Migration: These Are the Cities Americans Are Abandoning
the
Most,
USA
TODAY
(July
5,
2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/economy/2018/07/05/cities-americans-abandoningpopulation-migration/35801453/.
27

Election Initiatives Issue Brief, PEW CTR. ON THE STATES (Feb.
2012), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2012/pewupgradin
gvoterregistrationpdf.pdf.
28 Adam Liptak, Voter Rolls Are Rife with Inaccuracies, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
14, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/us/politics/us-voter-registration-rolls-are-indisarray-pew-report-finds.html.
29

Husted, 133 S. Ct. at 1863–64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

30

52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(1)(A) (2012).

31

Official USPS Change of Address, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
https://moversguide.usps.com/mgo/disclaimer?referral=UMOVE (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).
32

Husted, 133 S. Ct. at 1840.

33

Brief for Asian Americans Advancing Justice et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 28, Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018) (No. 16-980)
[hereinafter AAAJ Amicus Brief].
Voter List Accuracy, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATUREs (Jan. 22, 2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-list-accuracy.aspx.
34
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movers do not inform the Postal Service, 35 the states must rely on alternative methods
to identify the millions of voters who move out of their voting jurisdictions without
informing election officials.
Whatever supplemental methods a state uses, the NVRA requires election
authorities to send an address-confirmation notice to the registrant’s last known
address to confirm whether the registrant still lives there. 36 The address-confirmation
notice must include a pre-addressed, postage-paid return card.37 The NVRA further
requires that the confirmation notice must “explain what a registrant who has not
moved needs to do to stay on the rolls.”38
But even if the voter fails to mail back the return card, the state must wait years
before canceling the voter’s registration. 39 The NVRA mandates that—after sending
the confirmation notice—state election authorities cannot strike a non-responding
voter from the rolls until two federal election cycles pass without the voter
participating in any voting activity.40 Thus, the NVRA’s procedure is straightforward.
If a voter fails to respond to the address-confirmation notice, and then does not vote
in any election during the following two federal election cycles, the state may cancel
the voter’s registration.41 But not before then.42
All sides in the Husted case agreed on what happens after an address-confirmation
notice is sent. The parties agreed that the NVRA requires states to send an addressconfirmation notice to voters before canceling the voter’s registration. 43 The parties
also agreed that the NVRA requires election authorities to wait for two full federal
election cycles to pass before striking a non-responding voter from the registration
rolls.44

35

Husted, 133 S. Ct. at 1840; AAAJ Amicus Brief, supra note 33, at 28.

36

Husted, 133 S. Ct. at 1839; 52 U.S.C. §20507(d)(2) (2012).

37

Husted, 133 S. Ct. at 1839.

38

Id. at 1839; 52 U.S.C. §20507(d)(2) (2012).

Husted, 133 S. Ct. at 1839 (“Subsection (d) treats the failure to return a card as some
evidence—but by no means conclusive proof—that the voter has moved. Instead, the voter’s
name is kept on the list for a period covering two general elections for federal office (usually
about four years).”).
39

40

52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(1) (2012).

Husted, 138 S.Ct. at 1839 (“Only if the registrant fails to vote during that period and does
not otherwise confirm that he or she still lives in the district . . . may the registrant’s name be
removed.”).
41

42 52 U.S.C. § 20507(d)(2) (2012) (“If the card is not returned, affirmation or confirmation
of the registrant’s address may be required before the registrant is permitted to vote in a Federal
election during the period beginning on the date of the notice and ending on the day after the
date of the second general election for Federal office that occurs after the date of the notice, and
if the registrant does not vote in an election during that period the registrant’s name will be
removed from the list of eligible voters. . . .”).
43

Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1853 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

44

Id.
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The dispute in Husted concerned the circumstances under which the state could
send the address-confirmation notice in the first place. 45 The question turned on the
NVRA’s “Failure-to-Vote” clause.46 When enacted in 1993, the NVRA stated that
state voter registration programs “shall not result in the removal of the name of any
person . . . by reason of the person’s failure to vote.”47 But the act also expressly
permitted the states to cancel the registrations of voters who “did not mail back a return
card and did not vote during a period covering two general federal elections.”48
The Failure-to-Vote clause thus appeared to create a paradox. On the one hand, the
clause prohibited states from canceling a voter’s registration for failing to vote. 49 But
on the other hand, the NVRA expressly authorized states to cancel a voter’s
registration when two conditions were met: (1) the voter failed to mail back a return
card and (2) then failed to vote over the next two federal election cycles.50 Under what
circumstances, then, did the Failure-to-Vote Clause bar states from using non-voting
as grounds for removing a registrant?
Congress attempted to clarify matters nearly a decade later. In 2002 Congress
enacted the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”) as an amendment to the NVRA. 51 One
of HAVA’s new provisions explained that “registrants who have not responded to a
notice and who have not voted in two consecutive general elections for Federal office
shall be removed from the official list of eligible voters, except that no registrant may
be removed solely by reason of a failure to vote.”52 HAVA thus appeared to suggest
that a state could use failure to vote as a criterion for removing a voter from the voting
rolls, but not as the sole criterion. The state needed to have at least one additional
indication that the voter had changed addresses.
Like other states across the country, Ohio found itself forced to change its voting
registration procedures following the NVRA’s adoption in 1993. Prior to the NVRA,
Ohio had a strict practice of canceling voter registrations.53 The Ohio state constitution
directed state election authorities to cancel the registration of any voter who failed “to
vote in at least one election during any period of four consecutive years.” 54 Ohio
required such individuals to reregister before being allowed to vote again. 55

45

Id. at 1840–41 (majority opinion).

46

Id. at 1840; 52 U.S.C. § 20507(b)(2) (2012).

47

Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1840; 52 U.S.C. § 20507(b)(2) (2012).

48

Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1840.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id. at 1840.

52

Id. at 1840 (emphasis added); 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(4)(A) (2012).

53

Ohio A. Phillip Randolph Inst. v. Husted, No. 2:16-cv-303, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
84519, at *6 (S.D. Ohio June 29, 2016), rev’d, 838 F.3d 699 (6th Cir. 2016).
54 OHIO CONST. art. V, § 1 (“Any elector who fails to vote in at least one election during
any period of four consecutive years shall cease to be an elector unless he again registers to
vote.”); Husted, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84519, at *6.
55

OHIO CONST. art. V, § 1.
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In response to the NVRA, Ohio amended its registration maintenance process in
1994.56 To identify ineligible voters, the amended state law directed Ohio election
authorities to utilize the U.S. Postal Service’s national change of address (“NCOA”)
service.57 Ohio’s list maintenance procedure specifically requires the Ohio Secretary
of State to consult the Postal Service NCOA database on an annual basis to maintain
the State’s voter registration list.58
In Husted, neither the challengers nor the dissenting justices objected to Ohio’s
use of the NCOA process.59 Instead, they objected to the supplementary process Ohio
adopted to identify other ineligible registrants.60
At the time in which Ohio adopted the NCOA process, it also established a
“Supplemental Process” to identify and remove registrants who failed to notify the
Postal Service of their change of address.61 In compliance with the NVRA, Ohio’s
Supplemental Process incorporated both the address-confirmation process and the
post-notice waiting period of two federal election cycles—including a presidential
general election—before removing voters from the rolls.62 Ohio’s Supplemental
Process consisted of two stages. First, the state identified voters inactive for a twoyear period and sent them a notice warning them that their failure to vote could lead
to their removal from the voting rolls. 63 The notice informed the voters that they
needed to confirm their current address using a pre-addressed, postage-paid return
card provided by the state (as required by the NVRA). 64 Second, if a voter ignored the
notice and failed to mail back the return card, a clock began running on the voter’s
registration.65 If the voter ultimately skipped voting for a period of four years after
56

Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1840.

57

Id.

58

Husted, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84519, at *5.

59

See Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1841.

60

Id. at 1841.

61

Id. at 1840.

62 Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1840–01; see also Husted, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84519, at *6
(“Ohio implemented its current procedures to comply with and mirror the procedures
established by the NVRA.”), id. at *10 (“then fails to engage in any voter activity for a period
of four consecutive years, including two federal general elections (one being a presidential
general election) from the date that the confirmation card is mailed”).

Id. at *23–24 (“Pursuant to the Ohio Supplemental Process, a confirmation notice is sent
to voters who have been inactive for two years. If they do not respond to the confirmation notice,
they are placed on an inactive list, but their ability to vote does not change at that time.”).
63

64 Id. at *11 (“The boards of elections send each such individual identified a confirmation
notice by forwardable mail with a postage pre-paid return envelope . . . . If the individual returns
the confirmation notice and provides a new address, the individual’s registration record is
updated by the appropriate board of elections with the new address. If the individual returns the
confirmation notice confirming that his or her current address is still accurate, the board notes
on the individual’s registration record that the confirmation notice was returned to the board
and the address was confirmed.”) (internal citations omitted).
65 Id. (“If an individual fails to return the confirmation notice, fails to update his or her voter
registration, and fails to engage in any other voter activity, the individual will be marked as
‘inactive’ in the registration database. This ‘inactive’ individual has all the rights of an otherwise
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receiving the return card (for a total of six years of non-voting), the Ohio law
automatically removed the voter from the state registration list. 66
The controversy at issue in Husted arose from the method Ohio adopted to
determine when to send address-confirmation cards to voters.67 The Ohio law called
for sending return cards to registrants “whose lack of voter activity” over a two-year
period “indicates they may have moved.” 68 The statute defined “voter activity” as
casting a ballot in any federal, state, or local election,69 but it also included other
election-related activities, such as signing a petition, submitting a new voter
registration form, or updating a home address with state agencies. 70 Accordingly,
under the Supplemental Process, if a voter failed to engage in any “voter activity” over
a two-year period, the State of Ohio sent the voter a return card to confirm the voter’s
address.71
More than two decades after Ohio amended its list maintenance procedures, a
group of plaintiffs—the A. Philip Randolph Institute (“Randolph Institute”), the
Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless (“NEOCH”), and an Ohio voter named
Larry Harmon—brought suit against Ohio’s Republican Secretary of State, Jon
Husted, to enjoin the State from removing registered voters using the Supplemental
Process.72 The plaintiffs alleged that the Supplemental Process wrongfully canceled
the registrations of thousands of eligible voters. 73 They further alleged that the
Supplemental Process disproportionately burdened people of color and low-income
communities.74 The case emerged amid a nationwide uproar over a highly
controversial series of voting restrictions—including, especially, Voter ID laws—that
Republican legislatures across the country adopted in the 2010s.75 Critics claimed that
qualified elector, including the ability to cast a regular ballot at any election. If, however, four
years (including two federal general elections) passes without voter activity, at that time the
individual’s voter registration record is cancelled.”) (internal citations omitted).
66 Id. at *24 (“If those on the inactive list then fail to vote in the next two general federal
elections, one of which is a Presidential election, then those voters are removed from the voter
registration rolls.”).
67

Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1841.

68

Id. at 1840.

69

Id.

Id. at 1841 (“Moreover, the term ‘voter activity’ is broader than simply voting. It also
includes such things as ‘sign[ing] a petition,’ ‘filing a voter registration form, and updating a
voting address with a variety of [state] entities.’”).
70

71

Id. at 1840–41.

72

Husted, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84519, at *4.

73

Id. at *6.

74 Id. (“Plaintiffs state that ‘the [Ohio] Supplemental Process disproportionately burdens
Ohio’s most vulnerable and marginalized citizens. In Cuyahoga County, for example, the
purged voters disproportionately reside in communities of color and low-income
communities.’”).
75 See Danny Hakim and Michael Wines, ‘They Don’t Really Want Us to Vote’: How
Republicans
Made
It
Harder,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
3,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/us/politics/voting-suppression-elections.html.
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Republicans enacted these new laws to discourage minority constituencies aligned
with the Democratic Party from voting.76
The centerpiece of the plaintiffs’ legal argument was the contention that the
Supplemental Process violated the NVRA by using a voter’s failure to vote during a
two-year period as the “trigger” for sending the address-confirmation notice.77 The
plaintiffs asked the court “to interpret the NVRA as a mandate that voter inactivity
can only be considered after the confirmation notice is sent and cannot be used as the
trigger for initiating the address-confirmation process.”78
In 2016, the district court granted summary judgment to Secretary of State Husted,
holding that Ohio’s list maintenance policies “comply with and mirror the procedures
established by the NVRA.”79 The judge observed that the “Plaintiffs want the Court to
read requirements and language into the NVRA that simply are not there.” 80 The judge
emphasized that no provision in the NVRA barred states from using voter inactivity
as a trigger for initiating the address-confirmation process.81 The judge further pointed
out that Ohio removed voters from the State’s registration lists “only after a person
both (1) fails to respond to the confirmation process, and (2) subsequently fails to vote
in the following two general federal elections.”82 Accordingly, the district court
concluded that Ohio’s Supplemental Process complied with the NVRA because
“voters are never removed from the voter registration rolls solely for failure to vote.”83
But a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit disagreed.84 The panel majority focused
on the fact that Ohio sent the confirmation notice when voters failed to vote over a

76 See Amy Gardner, Concerns About Voter Access Dominate Final Stretch Before Election
Day, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/concerns-aboutvoter-access-dominate-final-stretch-before-election-day/2018/11/04/b660c216-dece-11e8b732-3c72cbf131f2_story.html?utm_term=.b0182428c8af; Ari Berman, How Voter
Suppression Could Swing the Midterms, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/opinion/sunday/voter-suppression-georgia-2018.html.
77 A. Phillip Randolph Institute v. Husted, 838 F.3d 699, 707–08 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 138
S. Ct. 1833 (2018) (“[U]nder the Supplemental Process, the confirmation notice procedure is
‘triggered’ by a registrant’s failure to engage in any ‘voter activity’ for two years.”).
78

Husted, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84519, at *21.

79

Id. at *7.

80

Id. at *22.

Id. (“Plaintiffs argue that Ohio may only send a confirmation notice to a voter ‘to confirm
a change of residence after the state has already obtained reliable second-hand information,
independent of the voter’s failure to vote, indicating that a voter has moved.’ Plaintiffs continue,
‘[a]llowing states to initiate the voter-removal process based on a failure to vote—as Ohio is
now doing—would eviscerate subsection (b)’s plain language, allowing the exception to
swallow the rule.’ However, this is not what the NVRA states. The plain language of the NVRA
contradicts Plaintiffs’ position”) (internal citations omitted).
81

82

Husted, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84519, at *24.

83

Id. at *23.

Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1841 (2018) (“A divided panel of
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.”).
84
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two-year period.85 The two judges in the majority concluded that the “operation of the
Supplemental Process’ trigger is ultimately based ‘solely’ on a person’s failure to
vote.”86 The panel viewed this as a fatal problem because the NVRA expressly
prohibited “the removal of the name of any person . . . by reason of the person’s failure
to vote.”87 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit panel ruled that the use of the two-year nonvoting period as a trigger for the confirmation notice procedure violated the NVRA’s
Failure-to-Vote Clause.88 One judge on the panel, however, saw things differently. In
dissent, Circuit Judge Siler argued that Ohio’s Supplemental Procedure complied with
the NVRA because the State only removed registrants if they failed to vote and they
“also failed to respond to the address-confirmation notice.”89
The divergent views on the Sixth Circuit panel foreshadowed the subsequent split
on the United States Supreme Court. The difference of opinion came down to a single
question: Did the NVRA’s Failure-to-Vote Clause bar the use of non-voting as a
trigger for sending the address-confirmation notice?
III. SCOTUS RULES FOR OHIO
In Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, the United States Supreme Court was
just as divided by the meaning of the NVRA’s Failure-to-Vote Clause as the lower
courts. In a 5-4 ruling, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and held that
Ohio’s Supplemental Process complied with the NVRA.90
In an opinion written by Justice Alito, the majority held that the NVRA permitted
states to use non-voting as the basis for determining whether to send an addressconfirmation notice to a voter.91 Justice Alito asserted that the NVRA simply barred
the “use of non-voting as the sole criterion for removing a registrant.”92 Accordingly,
in the majority’s view, sending an address-confirmation notice to a voter did not
constitute removing a registrant from the voting rolls. 93 It simply put the voter on
notice that state election authorities needed to confirm the voter’s address. 94 Therefore,
in the majority’s view, Ohio’s use of the address-confirmation card brought the State
85 A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Husted, 838 F.3d 699, 703 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct.
1833 (2018) (“After compiling a list of inactive voters, each BOE [Board of Elections] sends a
confirmation notice to those on its list.”).
86 Id. at 711 (quoting Common Cause of Colo. v. Buescher, 750 F.Supp.2d 1259, 1274 (D.
Colo. 2010)).
87

52 U.S.C. § 20507(b)(2) (2012); Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1840.

Husted, 838 F.3d at 711 (“operation of the Supplemental Process’ trigger is ultimately
based ‘solely’ on a person’s failure to vote.”).
88

89

Id. at 716 (Siler, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).

90 Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1848 (“The only question before us is whether it violates federal
law. It does not.”).
91

Id. at 1842.

Id. at 1842. (“We reject this argument because the Failure-to-Vote Clause, both as
originally enacted in the NVRA and as amended by HAVA, simply forbids the use of nonvoting
as the sole criterion for removing a registrant.”).
92

93

Id. at 1843.

94

Husted, 838 F.3d at 41–42 (Siler, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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into compliance with the NVRA.95 Ohio’s Supplemental Process only removed voters
from the rolls if they failed to vote over a six-year period and failed to respond to the
address confirmation notice, a procedure which the majority concluded was “expressly
permitted” by the NVRA.96
The dissent, in contrast, contended that the NVRA’s Failure-to-Vote Clause barred
states from using non-voting as a trigger for starting the process of removing a
registrant from the voting rolls.97 Writing for the dissenting justices, Justice Breyer
asserted that the words “by reason of the person’s failure to vote” were “most naturally
read to prohibit a State from considering a registrant’s failure to vote as part of any
process ‘that is used to start, or has the effect of starting, a purge of the voter rolls.’” 98
Although Justice Breyer conceded that, when Congress amended the NVRA in 2002,
it clarified that “no registrant may be removed solely by reason of a failure to vote,”
he did not think the qualification applied to the statute as a whole. 99 He argued that
Congress only intended for it to apply to the period after state election authorities had
already identified potentially ineligible voters and thus had already sent them addressconfirmation cards.100 In support of his narrow reading of the statute, Breyer pointed
out that HAVA inserted the word “solely” in the NVRA section that addressed
“registrants who have not responded to a notice,” but not in the actual text of the
Failure-to-Vote clause.101 In the view of the plaintiffs and the dissenting justices,
therefore, the NVRA only permitted states to consider non-voting after a state sent an
address-confirmation card to a registrant and the registrant failed to respond to it. 102
But the majority interpreted the NVRA’s text quite differently. The idea that nonvoting could be used as a criterion only after election authorities sent the voter a
confirmation card struck Justice Alito as nonsensical. 103 In support of his broader
reading of the statute, he pointed out an interesting juxtaposition. Just a few lines
below the Failure-to-Vote clause—which barred states from removing registrants
from the voting rolls “by reason of the person’s failure to vote”—Congress went on
to expressly permit removing registrants from the rolls if they ignored the addressconfirmation card and then failed to vote in two consecutive federal elections.104 In
Alito’s view, therefore, sole causation—not “but for” or proximate causation—was
95

Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1843.

96

Id. (holding that Ohio’s procedure is “expressly permitted by federal law”).

97

Id. at 1853 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

98

Id. at 1854 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 103–9, at 15).

99

Id.at 1858.

100 Id. at 1853 (“In sum, § 8 tells States the following: . . . Do not target registered voters for
removal from the registration roll because they have failed to vote. However, ‘using the
procedures described in subsections (c) and (d) to remove an individual’ from the federal voter
roll is permissible and does not violate the Failure–to–Vote prohibition.”).
101

Id. at 1858.

Id. at 1843 (majority opinion) (“Respondents argue that the clause allows States to
consider nonvoting only to the extent that subsection (d) requires—that is, only after a registrant
has failed to mail back a notice.”).
102

103

Id. at 1844.

104

Id. at 1842.
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the only logical reading of the statute. 105 Thus, while it was true that a registrant’s
failure to vote triggered Ohio’s process of reviewing the registrant’s address status and
sending the confirmation notice, the state’s procedure did not constitute a violation of
the Failure-to-Vote clause because Ohio used multiple criteria in ultimately removing
the voter from the registration rolls.106
As Justice Alito saw it, Congress “made this point explicit” by enacting the 2002
HAVA amendments, one of which expressly directed that “no registrant may be
removed solely by reason of a failure to vote.”107 The HAVA amendment, he
concluded, “dispelled any doubt that a state removal program may use the failure to
vote as a factor (but not the sole factor) in removing names from the list of registered
voters.”108 Justice Alito thus asserted that the Failure-to-Vote Clause and the HAVA
amendment should be read together as part of a cohesive whole to promote the
congressional intent that “no registrant may be removed solely by reason of a failure
to vote.”109 If a state only removed registrants who both failed to vote and failed to
respond to a notice, the state was in compliance with the NVRA.
Accordingly, the majority ruled that Ohio’s Supplemental Process complied with
the NVRA because “[i]t does not strike any registrant solely by reason of the failure
to vote” and it removes registrants in a manner “expressly permitted by federal law.” 110
As the majority emphasized, Ohio used non-voting as one indication that the voter
may have moved, but it did not use the failure to vote as an independent ground for
removal.111 Non-voting led to cancellation of a voter’s registration only in conjunction
with a voter’s failure to respond to the address-confirmation notice. As Justice Alito
explained, “Ohio does not remove a registrant on change-of-residence grounds unless
the registrant is sent and fails to mail back a return card and then fails to vote for an
additional four years.”112
The majority also emphatically rejected the idea that the NVRA gave federal courts
a general power to judge the reasonableness of state policy decisions. 113 In dissent,
Justice Breyer asserted that Congress required state list maintenance programs to use
“reasonable” means to determine if a voter had moved. 114 Ohio, the dissent argued,
had failed to use reasonable means in its Supplemental Process. According to the
dissenting justices, “using a registrant’s failure to vote is not a reasonable method for
105

Id. at 1843 (“By process of elimination, we are left with sole causation”).

106

Id.

107

Id. at 1843 (emphasis added).

108

Id.

Id. at 1842 (“the Failure-to-Vote Clause, both as originally enacted in the NVRA and as
amended by HAVA, simply forbids the use of nonvoting as the sole criterion for removing a
registrant, and Ohio does not use it that way. Instead, as permitted by subsection (d), Ohio
removes registrants only if they have failed to vote and have failed to respond to a notice.”).
109

110

Id. at 1843.

Id. at 1846 (“Ohio simply treats the failure to return a notice and the failure to vote as
evidence that a registrant has moved, not as a ground for removal.”).
111

112

Id. at 1842.

113

Id. at 1848.

114

Id. at 1851 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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identifying voters whose registrations are likely invalid (because they have changed
their addresses).”115 The dissent also argued that it was unreasonable to place much
weight on a registrant’s failure to respond to an address-notification card.116
But the majority easily brushed aside the dissent’s reasonableness argument by
pointing to the fact that the NVRA itself “attaches importance to the failure to send
back the card” and the registrant’s failure to vote. 117 As Justice Alito emphasized,
“[t]he NVRA plainly reflects Congress’s judgment that the failure to send back the
card, coupled with the failure to vote during the period covering the next two general
federal elections, is significant evidence that the addressee has moved.” 118 In short,
how could it be “unreasonable” for a state to follow the same procedures spelled out
in the NVRA itself?
Underlying the majority ruling was its conclusion that Congress left it to the states
to decide when an address-confirmation notice should be sent.119 The key point in the
majority’s view was the fact that NVRA did not explain or direct the circumstances
under which the address notification card could be sent.120 As the majority explained,
“[w]hile the NVRA is clear about the need to send a ‘return card’ (or obtain written
confirmation of a move) before pruning a registrant’s name, no provision of federal
law specifies the circumstances under which a return card may be sent.” 121 The
majority saw Congress’s failure to provide guidance regarding when the addressconfirmation process should begin as evidence that Congress left it to the states to
decide. As Justice Alito explained:
What matters for present purposes is not whether the Ohio Legislature
overestimated the correlation between nonvoting and moving or whether it
reached a wise policy judgment about when return cards should be sent.
For us, all that matters is that no provision of the NVRA prohibits the
legislature from implementing that judgment. Neither subsection (d) nor
any other provision of the NVRA demands that a State have some particular
quantum of evidence of a change of residence before sending a registrant a
return card. So long as the trigger for sending such notices is ‘uniform,
nondiscriminatory, and in compliance with the Voting Rights Act,’ States
can use whatever plan they think best. 122
The Court thus reversed the Sixth Circuit panel and upheld the legality of Ohio’s
Supplemental Process.123
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Husted elicited intense criticism from voting rights
advocates. John Nichols of the Nation magazine declared that the Husted ruling “gave
115

Id. at 1853–54.

116

Id. at 1854.

117

Id. at 1848 (majority opinion).

118

Id.

119

Id. at 1839.

120

Id.

121

Id.

122

Id. at 1847.

123

Id. at 1848.
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Republican secretaries of state a go-ahead to resume the antidemocratic practice of
purging fully qualified voters from registration rolls.” 124 Renée Graham of the Boston
Globe accused the Husted majority of “aiding and abetting voter suppression.”125
Leading Democrats also condemned the decision. Senator Elizabeth Warren warned
that “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision to make it easier for Ohio to cross eligible voters
off the rolls is a major step backwards for our democracy.” 126 Similarly, Senator Bernie
Sanders declared that “[i]t’s a travesty that the Supreme Court upheld Ohio’s voter
suppression efforts.”127
From a public policy perspective, the critics made important points. As discussed
in the next section below, Ohio’s Supplemental Process is not sound public policy.
But from a legal perspective, the majority’s reasoning was ultimately far more
persuasive than the dissent. The legal question was simple: When may states use nonvoting as an indication that a voter has changed addresses? The dissenters’ answer to
that question made little sense in practical terms. After all, the dissenting justices
conceded that the NVRA permits states to cancel a voter’s registration if the voter fails
to respond to an address-confirmation card and then fails to vote for two consecutive
federal election cycles.128 At the same rate, however, the dissenters insisted that the
NVRA does not permit state election authorities to initiate the address-confirmation
process on the basis of a voter’s failure to vote.
The dissent’s interpretation of the NVRA thus created a strange paradox. Why
would Congress bar the use of non-voting as a trigger for sending an addressconfirmation card, but then permit its use as a trigger for later cancelling the voter’s
registration? Cancelling a voter’s registration is a far more severe penalty than simply
being sent an address-confirmation notice. As a matter of logic and fairness, it would
make more sense to permit the use of non-voting as a basis for sending the addressconfirmation notice but not to permit the use of non-voting as a criterion for cancelling
a voter’s registration. The dissent nevertheless claimed that the NVRA created an odd
system that barred the use of non-voting for notification purposes but permitted it for
cancellation purposes. The dissent never adequately explained why Congress would
have created such a convoluted statute.

124

John Nichols, How Did the Supreme Court Give a Green Light to Massive Voter
Suppression? Two Words: Neil Gorsuch, THE NATION (June 11, 2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/supreme-court-give-green-light-massive-votersuppression/.
125

Renée Graham, The Supreme Court Aids and Abets Voter Suppression, BOS. GLOBE
(June 12, 2018), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/06/12/supreme-court-aids-andabets-voter-suppression/A304hBnWqfQ3eiMmmw5NiO/story.html.
126 Andrea Germanos, ‘Setback for Voting Rights’: Supreme Court Upholds Ohio’s VoterPurge
Process,
COMMON
DREAMS
(June
11,
2018),
https://www.commondreams.org/news/2018/06/11/setback-voting-rights-supreme-courtupholds-ohios-voter-purge-process.
127

Id.

Husted, 138 S.Ct. at 1853 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In sum, § 8 tells States the following:
. . . Do not target registered voters for removal from the registration roll because they have failed
to vote. However, ‘using the procedures described in subsections (c) and (d) to remove an
individual’ from the federal voter roll is permissible and does not violate the Failure–to–Vote
prohibition.”).
128
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In contrast, the majority offered a far more sensible interpretation of the NVRA.
Justice Alito drew the quite logical inference that if four years of non-voting could be
used as a criterion for cancelling the registration of a voter who failed to respond to an
address-confirmation card, then surely it was also permissible to use two-years of nonvoting as a basis for sending the confirmation card in the first place. 129
Further support for the majority’s reasoning came from the fact that Ohio’s law—
which was enacted in 1994—did not face a serious court challenge until 20 years and
10 federal election cycles after its passage. If Ohio and other states had so badly
misread the NVRA, why had the issue not ended up in the courts decades before the
Husted case?
The belated timing of the case suggested the real dispute was not over the legality
of Ohio’s Supplemental Process, but rather was part of a new national battle over
election administration policy. Indeed, contrary to the misleading impression created
by press coverage,130 Ohio’s Supplemental Process did not represent a new Republican
effort to disenfranchise Democratic voters. Republican and Democratic secretaries of
state had enforced the Ohio law for twenty years without controversy.131 Moreover, if
it were so obvious that Ohio’s Supplemental Process (and similar list maintenance
procedures in other states) violated the NVRA, voting rights advocates had a golden
opportunity to amend and clarify the NVRA during the first two years of Barack
Obama’s presidency. In 2009–2010 Democrats held the White House and large
majorities in both houses of Congress. 132 The Democrats could have amended the
NVRA in any manner without needing the support of a single Republican member of
Congress. But during the 2009-2010 term, neither the Obama Administration nor the
Democratic Congress expressed significant objections to the procedures adopted by
states like Ohio to maintain their registration lists. Only in the 2010s—as Voter ID
laws became a flashpoint of national controversy—did voter registration systems
become a hot button national issue.133 The late-arising nature of the legal dispute thus

129

Id. at 1841 (majority opinion).

See Richard Pildes, Ohio’s Voter Purge Law Has Been in Place for 24 Years, ELECTION
L. BLOG (June 12, 2018) https://electionlawblog.org/?p=99500 (“[I]f the media coverage of
this case has left you with the impression this was a recently enacted law, that’s wrong”).
130

For a thoughtful discussion of this point, see Justin Levitt, Voter Registration’s
Disappointing Day at the Court, AM. CONST. SOC’Y BLOG (June 12, 2018),
https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/voter-registrations-disappointing-day-at-the-court/ (“This is
not a new piece of voter suppression devised by current elections officials: Ohio put the process
in place 24 years ago, and it has been implemented by both Rs and Ds.”).
131

132 Elana Schor, Democrats in Firm Control of Both Houses, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2008),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/06/us-elections-2008-democrats-congresshouse-representatives.

Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Upholds Ohio’s Way of Removing Infrequent Voters from
Rolls,
WASH.
POST
(June
11,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-upholds-ohios-way-ofremoving-voters-from-rolls-after-they-miss-elections/2018/06/11/5013195e-62c4-11e8-a768ed043e33f1dc_story.html?utm_term=.61a7be18495c (“The subtext of the decision was a
continuing battle between Republicans and Democrats over laws that regulate who gets to vote
and when, including voter-ID requirements and restrictions on early voting. Republicans say
the integrity of the process demands ensuring that only the eligible vote, while Democrats say
133
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provided further evidence that Ohio’s procedure complied with the NVRA. If not,
litigation over it would have occurred in the 1990s, not the 2010s.
Also missing from the dissent was an appreciation of the states’ legitimate interest
in updating their voting rolls, an interest that the NVRA expressly recognized and
promoted.134 Although Justice Breyer minimized the change-of-address issue by
emphasizing that only 4% of Americans move out of their counties every year, 135 4%
translates to over twelve million people, a significant number that creates ongoing
administrative challenges for state election authorities. The postal service notification
system is insufficient because 30-to-40% of Americans who change addresses fail to
notify the postal service.136 For that reason, the NVRA directs the states “to ‘conduct
a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names’ of voters who
are ineligible ‘by reason of’ death or change in residence.” 137 Thus, identifying and
removing inactive voters from registration lists is not simply a necessary component
of competent election administration; it is a federal mandate under the NVRA, one
that Ohio complied with through the Supplemental Process.
The bottom line is that the NVRA gives states broad discretion in deciding how to
maintain the accuracy of their voter registration lists. Few would have disagreed with
that conclusion prior to the 2010s. Indeed, the Federal Election Commission noted in
1997—two decades before the Husted controversy—that “[t]he list maintenance
provisions of the NVRA grant the States considerable latitude in the routine and
systematic methods by which they may ensure the accuracy of their voter registration
lists by removing the names of those who are no longer eligible.” 138 Congress gave
states such broad leeway under the act that it did not even assign enforcement of the
NVRA to any particular federal agency.139
To be sure, Congress should have taken a more careful approach when drafting the
NVRA. As discussed below, it was a mistake to give states such wide discretion. The
NVRA should have provided clearer and more comprehensive guidance to ensure that
list maintenance procedures did not lead to the disenfranchisement of eligible voters.
that voter fraud is practically nonexistent and that the goal should be to enfranchise all who are
eligible.”).
134

About the National Voter Registration Act, supra note 20.

135

Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1856 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“Ohio tells us that a small number of Americans—about 4% of all Americans—move outside
of their county each year.”).
136

Id. at 1840 (majority opinion).

137

Id. at 1838.

138

The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administration of
Federal Elections, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (June 1997), https://www.fec.gov/about/reportsabout-fec/agency-operations/impact-national-voter-registration-act-1993-administrationfederal-elections-html/.
CROCKER, supra note 23, at 10 (“Under the NVRA, no federal agency is responsible for
implementation of the act. Although the FEC (EAC) was responsible for developing the mail
registration form and for delivering a report to Congress every two years on the effectiveness
of the NVRA, it had no further legal authority under the act. Similarly, the Department of Justice
could bring suit against a state for the nonimplementation of the law, or for violations as
specifically outlined in the NVRA, but had no authority to prescribe state implementation of the
law. Implementation is, and has always been, the sole responsibility of each state.”).
139
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But that is a legislative prerogative, not a judicial mandate. As Justice Alito
emphasized in the majority opinion in Husted:
[T]his case presents a question of statutory interpretation, not a question of
policy. We have no authority to second-guess Congress or to decide
whether Ohio’s Supplemental Process is the ideal method for keeping its
voting rolls up to date. The only question before us is whether it violates
federal law. It does not.140
Justice Alito got it exactly right. The Constitution does not permit the Supreme
Court to supplant the Congress as the Nation’s federal legislative body. Consequently,
in the Husted case, the Court’s sole responsibility was to apply the language of the
NVRA to the Ohio statute, not to rewrite the law. The majority fulfilled its
responsibility in a sensible and competent manner, notwithstanding the ruling’s
unpopularity with much of the country.
IV. A POST-HUSTED REFORM AGENDA
The fact that Ohio’s Supplemental Process complies with the NVRA does not
mean Ohio’s list maintenance procedure constitutes sound public policy. It does not.
The Supplemental Process fails to provide sufficient notice to inactive voters prior to
removing them from the state registration list. Making matters worse, Ohio and many
other states do not offer safeguards—such as same-day registration—to protect voters
wrongfully purged from the state’s voting rolls. Legislative reform of the system is
therefore both necessary and long overdue.
Although the dissenting justices in Husted did not make a persuasive legal
argument, they nevertheless offered a compelling policy critique of the Ohio statute.
In his dissent, Justice Breyer hit upon the core problem with Ohio’s Supplemental
Process: a single postcard notice is woefully inadequate. 141 In an age when email and
other types of electronic messaging have become the dominant form of
communication, many eligible voters will inevitably overlook a single notice sent via
U.S. Mail. The U.S. Mail simply no longer plays the vital role it once did in American
life. Email, texting, and online options for paying bills have supplanted the U.S. Postal
Service, leading to a large decline in mail volume. 142 The overall volume of mail has
fallen by 36% since 2007.143
In the meantime, the percentage of junk mail has surged. 144 To address its multibillion dollar deficits, the U.S. Postal Service in the early 2010s began to actively

140

Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1848.

141

See id.

142 Ryan W. Miller, Debt-Plagued U.S. Postal Service Eyes Bipartisan Bill to Solve Woes,
USA TODAY (March 1, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/03/01/debtplagued-us-postal-service-eyes-bipartisan-bill-solve-woes/97944594/.
143

Id.

144

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., UNITED STATES POSTAL SERV., RARC-WP-16-006,
ADVERTISING
MAIL:
PAST
AND
PRESENT
(Mar.
28,
2016),
https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-files/2016/RARC-WP-16006_0.pdf.
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solicit junk mail from advertisers to bolster declining postal revenues. 145 Unwanted
advertisements now account for 59% of all mail delivered by the U.S. Postal Service 146
and the average American receives forty-one pounds of junk mail per year.147
The dramatic increase in junk mail heightens the risk that voters will overlook
address-confirmation notices. For example, a study by New York University found
that 44% of junk mail is thrown away unopened. 148 One can easily imagine how a
voter might inadvertently discard a single postcard mailing from the secretary of state
amid a sea of junk mail. Although the NVRA’s return card system may have made
sense a quarter-century ago in the age before email, it no longer accurately reflects
how Americans communicate. Therefore, as a public policy matter, the Ohio return
card procedure is manifestly inadequate. It can and should be replaced with a more
effective method for notifying inactive voters.
Ohioans’ low response rate to the address-confirmation notices further underscores
the scale of the problem. For example, the Ohio Secretary of State’s Office sent 1.5
million address-confirmation notices to inactive voters in 2012.149 Approximately
300,000 people responded, with 60,000 confirming they had moved and 235,000
reporting that they had not moved.150 The upshot is over one million people failed to
respond, a number far larger than the total number of people who moved out of
Ohio.151 Adding to the concern is the disproportionate burden the Supplemental
Process places on minority and impoverished communities. 152 For example, as Justice
Sotomayor pointed out in her dissent, the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People found that in 2012 “African–American–majority neighborhoods in

145 Ron Nixon, Seeking Revenue, Postal Service Plans to Deliver More Junk Mail, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 9, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/business/seeking-revenue-postalservice-plans-to-deliver-more-junk-mail.html.
146 How
to Stop Junk Mail—Forever, CBS NEWS (May 10, 2011),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-to-stop-junk-mail-forever/ (“Advertising mail accounts
for 59 percent of all mail Americans receive. But only half of that mail is ever read, according
to the United States Postal Service.”).
147 Elisabeth Leamy, How to Stop Junk Mail and Save Trees—and Your Sanity, WASH. POST
(Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/home/how-to-stop-junk-mail-andsave-trees--and-your-sanity/2018/02/12/6000e4c4-05d9-11e8-b48cb07fea957bd5_story.html?utm_term=.9fbf70943996.
148 Amy Rowley, Event Advertising Turns Green with Boosts from Digital Media, NORTH
AMERICA TALK (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.northamericatalk.com/news/green-advertisingoptions/.
149

Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1856 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

150

Id.

Id. (“[T]hose 1 million or so voters accounted for about 13% of Ohio's voting population.
So if those 1 million or so registered voters (or even half of them) had, in fact, moved, then
vastly more people must move each year in Ohio than is generally true of the roughly 4% of all
Americans who move to a different county nationwide (not all of whom are registered voters).
But there is no reason to think this. Ohio offers no such reason. And the streets of Ohio’s cities
are not filled with moving vans; nor has Cleveland become the Nation’s residential moving
companies’ headquarters.”) (internal citations omitted).
151

152

Id. 138 S. Ct. at 1865–66 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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downtown Cincinnati had 10% of their voters removed due to inactivity” whereas the
same was true of “only 4% of voters in a suburban, majority-white neighborhood.”153
The only saving grace is the fact that, ironically, Ohio’s turnout rate has steadily
increased over the last two decades.154 For example, voter turnout in presidential
elections in Ohio rose from 57.8% in 2000155 to 64.2% in 2016.156 Midterm elections
have also seen a significant turnout increase in Ohio. 157 For example, voter turnout in
Ohio rose from 40.3% in the 2002 midterm elections158 to 50.9% in the 2018 midterm
elections.159 Because the Supplemental Process only removes voters from the rolls
after six consecutive years of not voting, the spike in voter turnout reduces the number
of voters stricken from the state’s registration rolls. The turnout increase has thus
mitigated some of the Supplemental Process’s flaws.
But increased turnout does not relieve election authorities of their obligation to
ensure that no one is wrongfully disenfranchised. Even at a time of much improved
turnout rates, some voters choose not to vote for six consecutive years. Therefore, in
removing ineligible voters from registration lists, the states should put in place
appropriate safeguards to protect eligible voters from the purge process.
Unfortunately, however, the NVRA’s minimal standards do not mandate that the states
adopt such safeguards.
Accordingly, Congress should strengthen the NVRA to prevent state voter
registration purges from disenfranchising eligible voters.
First, Congress should require the states to substantially expand the notice they
provide to voters who face removal from registration rolls. At a minimum, Congress
should require state election authorities to send address-confirmation mailings to
inactive voters on an annual basis. Sending more than one notice is crucial, as the
example of political campaigns demonstrates. It is a routine feature of election seasons
that political campaigns inundate voters with direct mailings.160 The reason is because
voters are more likely to respond to multiple mailings than just a single contact.
153

Id. at 1864.

154 Compare 2000 November General Election Turnout Rates, UNITED STATES ELECTIONS
PROJECT (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.electproject.org/2000g, with 2016 November General
Election Turnout Rates, UNITED STATES ELECTIONS PROJECT (Sept. 5, 2018),
http://www.electproject.org/2016g.
155

2000 November General Election Turnout Rates, supra note 154.

156

2016 November General Election Turnout Rates, supra note 154.

157 Compare 2002 November General Election Turnout Rates, UNITED STATES ELECTIONS
PROJECT (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.electproject.org/2002g, with 2018 November General
Election Turnout Rates, UNITED STATES ELECTIONS PROJECT (Dec. 14, 2018),
http://www.electproject.org/2018g.
158

2002 November General Election Turnout Rates, supra note 157.

159

2018 November General Election Turnout Rates, supra note 157.

160

See, e.g., Martin E. Comas, Political Mailers Are Pesky but Effective, Experts Say,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/politics/ospolitical-campaign-fliers-mailers-20161021-story.html (describing how Florida voters’
mailboxes were “filled lately with glossy, colorful and sometimes obnoxious fliers from
candidates hoping to grab a voter’s attention for a few seconds before the mail pieces land in
the recycling bin.”).
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Indeed, political scientists have found that “direct mail raises turnout by .6 percentage
points for each mailing.”161 Keenly aware of that fact, the average political campaign
sends four-to-nine mailings to its target voters each election cycle. 162 If any doubt
remained about the importance that campaigns place on repeated contacts with voters,
they should be allayed by the 2.7 billion pieces of political mail the U.S. Postal Service
delivered during the 2018 election.163 If the candidates understand the importance of
sending multiple mailings to voters, then elected officials should as well.
Address-confirmation notices should also be sent in multiple formats. As email
and texting have become major communications platforms, state election authorities
should take reasonable steps to collect more information from voters than just home
addresses. On a purely voluntary basis, registrants should be asked for their email
address and cellphone number. If election authorities employ a combination of email,
text, and U.S. Mail notices to confirm current addresses, far fewer voters will fall
through the cracks.
The federal government has an important role to play as well. Congress should
require election authorities to cross-check voter address information with federal
government databases before concluding that a voter has changed addresses. The
federal government possesses up-to-date address information on tens of millions of
Americans who receive Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and veteran’s benefits.
To assist the state governments in administering federal elections, Congress should
allow state election authorities easy access to all address-related data in the federal
government’s possession.
The federal government’s data could be put to use in an even more direct way.
Automatic voter registration offers the most comprehensive and efficient way to put
millions of currently unregistered Americans on voting rolls. To that end, state and
federal authorities should take responsibility for registering all eligible citizens to vote
by using information from the Social Security Administration, departments of motor
vehicles, state universities, and other government agencies.164 As a study by the
161 Alan S. Gerber & Donald P. Green, The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and
Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 653, 600 (2000).
162 Id. (“Direct mail vendors informed us that a regimen of 4 to 9 mailings is common in
political campaigns”).

D. Eadware Tree, Eight Factors That Drove This Year’s Red Hot Political Direct Mail
Season, PRINTING IMPRESSIONS (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.piworld.com/post/eight-factorsthat-drove-this-years-red-hot-political-direct-mail-season/ (“The average registered voter in the
U.S. received about 24 pieces of mail from political campaigns this year, for a total of 2.7 billion
pieces.”);
Political
Mail
Revenue
Grows,
MAIL
MAG.,
https://mailomg.com/2018/11/29/political-mail-revenue-grows/ (last visited April 14, 2019);
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., UNITED STATES POSTAL SERV., MR-MA-16-001, POLITICAL MAIL
STRATEGY 1 (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-libraryfiles/2016/MR-MA-16-001.pdf.
163

164

The Case for Automatic Voter Registration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (2016),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Case_for_Automatic_Voter_Re
gistration.pdf; Jonathan Brater et al., Purges: A Growing Threat to the Right to Vote, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. 6 (July 20, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/purges-growingthreat-right-vote (“When an eligible citizen gives information to the government—for example,
to get a driver’s license, receive Social Security benefits, apply for public services, register for
classes at a public university, or become a naturalized citizen—she will be automatically
registered to vote unless she chooses to opt out. No separate process or paper form is required.
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Brennan Center for Justice pointed out, the government data is already vetted and thus
provides an accurate source of registration information. 165 The adoption of a modern
electronic registration system will harness, in real time, the vast amount of data the
government holds, thus eliminating the risk of outdated or duplicate registrations. 166
The nationwide adoption of an automatic voter registration system would bring the
United States into line with peer democracies around the world. 167 In countries as
diverse as Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Germany, Peru and Sweden the national
governments maintain and update voter registration databases. 168 Although state
governments in the United States administer both federal and state elections, the
federal government can and should offer far more assistance to the states in updating
voter registration lists. The best model for Congress to use is quite close to home. In
Canada, all federal and provincial agencies share in real time voter address and
eligibility information with Elections Canada, the Canadian version of the Federal
Election Commission.169 By integrating federal and provincial databases Canada’s
93% registration rate is far higher than that of the United States, and, ironically, costs
35% less than the American system to maintain. 170 The bottom line is the burden of

Once the voter completes her interaction with the agency, if she doesn’t decline, her information
is electronically and securely sent to election officials to be added to the rolls. Once registered,
election officials would send each eligible voter a confirmation that their registration has been
accepted, providing a receipt and confirmation for any electronic voter transaction.”).
Id. at 7 (“The most appropriate agencies for automatic registration already collect
citizenship information and the other information needed for voter registration—so the data
being used has already been vetted. It is this already-vetted information that will form the basis
for voter registration records and updates. A modern system will reduce errors of all types
throughout the registration process, including improper registrations. And election officials will
continue to review applications for eligibility and errors”).
165

Id. at 11 (“In 2012, the Pew Center found that more than 1.8 million deceased individuals
are listed as voters. In 2014, North Carolina’s elections board reported finding thousands of
names and birth dates on their rolls that matched those of people who voted elsewhere. Some
fear that these deceased and duplicate registrations could help unscrupulous people manipulate
our elections. At the very least, these concerns about security undermine the public’s confidence
in our voting system. But a modern system effectively counters the threat. Duplications and
deceased registrants can be dramatically reduced if public officials are constantly updating the
rolls based on automatically transmitted information. In this respect, modernizing reforms can
make our elections more secure and boost voters’ confidence in our system.”).
166

167 Heather Gerken, Make It Easy: The Case for Automatic Registration, DEMOCRACY J.
(2013),
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/28/make-it-easy-the-case-for-automaticregistration/.
168

Adam Liptak, Voter Rolls Are Rife with Inaccuracies, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
14, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/us/politics/us-voter-registration-rolls-are-indisarray-pew-report-finds.html.
169 Michael Li et al., Three Things the U.S. Could Learn from Canada’s Election, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/three-things-us-couldlearn-canadas-election.
170

Liptak, supra note 168; Li et al., supra note 169.
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getting voters registered should rest primarily on the government, rather than on the
voters themselves.171
Most importantly, Congress should no longer permit states to create arbitrary and
unnecessary registration deadlines.172 Many states require voters to register in advance
of elections, with some state registration deadlines coming as early as four weeks
before Election Day.173 At present, only seventeen states plus the District of Columbia
offer same-day registration.174As the name suggests, same-day registration permits
voters to register and vote on the same day, including Election Day and during early
voting periods.175
The Husted decision would be rendered moot if Congress directed the states to
adopt same-day registration for federal elections. If a registration purge wrongfully
removes an eligible voter, same-day registration permits the voter to reregister and
vote at the same time. But early, pre-election registration deadlines can prevent
wrongfully removed voters from casting a ballot if the voter does not discover their
removal until after the registration deadline has passed. Same-day registration is thus
a crucial safeguard to prevent eligible voters from being disenfranchised by inaccurate
or overzealous voter registration purges. If every state adopted same-day registration,
no one would be wrongfully disenfranchised by failing to respond to a single addressconfirmation notice.

As Ellen Kurz has argued, “Why can’t voting be automatic with Selective Service
Registration and expanded to include women? Or with a Social Security number?” See Ellen
Kurz, Registration Is a Voter-Suppression Tool. Let’s Finally End It, WASH. POST (Oct. 11,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/registration-is-a-voter-suppression-toollets-finally-end-it/2018/10/11/e1356198-cca1-11e8-a36085875bac0b1f_story.html?utm_term=.913f47ba8ff7.
171

Same Day Voter Registration, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 3, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-registration.aspx.
172

173 See Eugene D. Mazo, Residency and Democracy: Durational Residency Requirements
from the Framers to the Present, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 611, 647–48 (2016) (“In Hawaii, the
registration cut-off deadline is thirty days. In other states, such as Florida and Arizona, the cutoff is twenty-nine days. In Kentucky, it is twenty-eight days. Another set of states requires
approximately three weeks for new registrations. The time period is twenty-four days in
Oklahoma; twenty-two days in Colorado; twenty-one days in Maryland, Maine, Oregon,
Virginia, and West Virginia; and twenty days in Kansas, Massachusetts, and Minnesota. Other
jurisdictions close their registration periods approximately two weeks before an election. In
Alabama and California the period is fourteen days, and in Iowa it is eleven days. Connecticut
requires a new voter to be registered only seven days before an election, and at least one state—
North Dakota—uses same-day voter registration, so that a new voter could actually register to
vote and cast his or her ballot on the same day.”).
174

Id.

175 The Case for Automatic Voter Registration, supra note 164, at 8 (“One highly successful
option is same-day registration, which would allow every eligible voter to register and vote on
Election Day and during early voting. This protection ensures that voters do not bear the brunt
of government mistakes, and it has significantly boosted turnout in every state that has adopted
it. At a minimum, it is critical that every state has procedures during the voting period that
permit voters to correct any error or omission on the rolls and be able to cast a ballot that counts.
And in a fully modern system, this fail-safe would rarely be used because the rolls would be far
more complete and accurate.”).
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There is a growing awareness in Congress of the need to reform state voter
registration procedures. In the 1970s, Congress nearly implemented a national
“postcard” registration system, but the House and Senate failed to reconcile
differences in the proposed bills.176 The issue remained dormant until partisan battles
over election rules in the 2010s rekindled the idea of expanding the NVRA to include
election day and same-day registration.177 In 2017 Senator Amy Klobuchar authored
a bill to amend the NVRA to require states to make same-day registration available in
all federal elections.178 Her bill provided that:
[E]ach State shall permit any eligible individual on the day of a Federal
election and on any day when voting, including early voting, is permitted
for a Federal election—(A) to register to vote in such election at the polling
place using a form that meets the requirements under section 9(b) of the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (52 U.S.C. 20508(b)); and (B) to
cast a vote in such election.179
The Senate did not act on Senator Klobuchar’s bill, but as a policy matter her
proposal is exactly right. The House of Representatives has taken up Klobuchar’s
proposal and seems likely to approve it.180 In January 2019, House Democrats
introduced H.R. 1, which would require states to adopt both automatic voter
registration and same-day registration for federal elections. 181
It is possible that some states might bring a legal challenge if Congress expanded
the NVRA to require same-day registration. In his concurring opinion in Husted,
Justice Thomas hinted at a constitutional argument against expanding the NVRA’s
registration requirements.182 Thomas observed that “constitutional text and history
both ‘confirm that States have the exclusive authority to set voter qualifications and
to determine whether those qualifications are satisfied.’” 183 The justice’s concurrence
emphasized the limited nature of the Constitution’s Elections Clause, which authorizes

176

CROCKER, supra note 23, at 1.

177

Same Day Registration Act, S. 360, 115th Cong. (2017).

178

Id.

179

Id.

180 Chris Carson & Virginia Kase, Why Same Day Registration Is Critical to the Success of
HR1, THE HILL (Dec. 31, 2018), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/423343-whysame-day-registration-is-critical-to-the-success-of-hr1.
181 Lindsay McPherson, House Democrats Unveil First Major Legislative Package of
Voting, Campaign Finance and Ethics Overhauls, ROLL CALL (Jan. 4, 2019),
https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/house-democrats-unveil-first-major-legislativepackage-of-voting-campaign-finance-and-ethics-overhauls; Tim Lau & Daniel I. Weiner,
Historic Bill to Strengthen Democracy Introduced in Congress, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan.
3, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/historic-bill-strengthen-democracy-introducedcongress.
182 Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1849 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
183

Id. (quoting Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 29 (2013) (Thomas,
J., dissenting)).
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Congress to regulate the “Time, Place, and Manner” of federal elections.184 In his
concurring opinion in Husted, Thomas pointedly noted that the Elections Clause “does
not give Congress the authority to displace state voter qualifications or dictate what
evidence a State may consider in deciding whether those qualifications have been
met.”185
Consequently, states with a durational residency requirement might argue that a
federal mandate requiring states to provide Election Day registration exceeds
Congress’s authority under the Elections Clause. For example, Mississippi requires
voters to have established a Mississippi residency at least thirty days prior to an
election.186
But it is noteworthy that no other justice joined Thomas’s concurrence, and for
good reason. The Supreme Court has long recognized Congress’s authority to set
registration requirements for federal elections.187 For example, in amending the Voting
Rights Act in 1970, Congress barred the “States from disqualifying voters in national
elections for presidential and vice-presidential electors because they have not met state
residency requirements.”188 Accordingly, in Oregon v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court
upheld the VRA amendment.189 Equally important, in 1972 the Supreme Court struck
down Tennessee’s one-year durational residency requirement, holding that “the
durational residence requirements in this case founder because of their crudeness as a
device for achieving the articulated state goal of assuring the knowledgeable exercise
of the franchise.”190
Therefore, it seems likely that the Supreme Court would affirm the
constitutionality of a congressional mandate that the states adopt same-day registration
in federal elections.191 As the Supreme Court noted in an 1879 case, “the power of
184 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places
of chusing Senators”).
185

Husted, 138 U.S. at 1850 (Thomas, J. concurring).

186 See Mississippi Voter Information Guide 2, http://www.sos.ms.gov/electionsvoting/documents/voterinformationguide.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2019).

See, e.g., Mazo, supra note 173, at 645 (“given that the Supreme Court has declared
lengthy residency requirements for voting in state and local elections unconstitutional, most of
the states have changed or eliminated their durational residency requirements to comply with
the Court’s rulings.”).
187

188

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970).

189

Id. at 119.

190 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 357–58, 360 (1972) (“Here, there is simply too
attenuated a relationship between the state interest in an informed electorate and the fixed
requirement that voters must have been residents in the State for a year and the county for three
months. Given the exacting standard of precision we require of statutes affecting constitutional
rights, we cannot say that durational residence requirements are necessary to further a
compelling state interest.”).
191 See, e.g., Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.
2652, 2670 (2015) (describing Congress’s “plenary authority” under the Elections Clause to
“make or alter” state redistricting plans); see also L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS22628, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CREATING AN AT
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Congress over the subject [of House elections] is paramount. It may be exercised as
and when Congress sees fit to exercise it. When exercised, the action of Congress, so
far as it extends and conflicts with the regulations of the State, necessarily supersedes
them.”192 Similarly, in a 1946 case, the Court asserted that:
[T]he Constitution has conferred upon Congress exclusive authority to
secure fair representation by the States in the popular House and left to that
House
determination
whether
States
have
fulfilled
their
responsibility . . . . Whether Congress faithfully discharges its duty or not,
the subject has been committed to the exclusive control of Congress. 193
Supreme Court precedents thus make clear that the Constitution gives Congress
the authority it needs to improve the NVRA. All that remains is for Congress to
exercise the will to improve the law.
But the optimism that informs proposals to expand the NVRA must be tempered
by two realities. The first is that neither the White House nor the Senate shows any
interest in amending the NVRA. In this era of hyperpolarization, election law changes
have become intensely partisan matters. 194 It is highly unlikely that Congress would
enact substantive election law reforms at a time of divided government. Any real
change, therefore, is likely to be at least a few years away.
The second reality is that states have proven stubbornly effective at disregarding
some of the NVRA’s more demanding provisions. Although the NVRA has
undeniably increased voter registration rates,195 states have undermined the law to a
troubling degree. As Justin Weinstein-Tull explained in a recent study, both the
NVRA and HAVA have been met with “widespread noncompliance” by states in
several important respects.196 One major reason for noncompliance is the delegation
of election administration to county governments, local entities that sometimes fail to
understand—let alone meet—their obligations under federal law. 197

LARGE DISTRICT 2 (2008) (observing that the Supreme Court has interpreted the Elections
Clause “to mean that Congress has extensive power to regulate most elements of congressional
elections, including a broad authority to protect the integrity of those elections”).
192

Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 384 (1879).

193

Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946).

194 On hyperpolarization and the politicization of election law, see Anthony J. Gaughan,
Illiberal Democracy: The Toxic Mix of Fake News, Hyperpolarization, and Partisan Election
Administration, 12 DUKE J. OF CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 59 (2017).
195 CROCKER, supra note 23, at 21(“A survey conducted by the National Association of
Secretaries of State (NASS) of 43 states covered by the NVRA indicated that gains in voter
registration had occurred in every state.”).
196

Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 U. MICH. L. REV. 747, 751 (2016).

Id. at 752 (“The Constitution initiates decentralization by placing the primary
responsibility for holding elections with states. States have further decentralized election
administration by delegating most election administration responsibilities to local
governments”), id. at 800 (“Federal election legislation like the NVRA, UOCAVA, and HAVA,
which all seek to standardize aspects of the elections process, suffers from noncompliance in
part because the statutes ask states to assume administrative responsibilities that states have
delegated to local governments.”).
197
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One example is the “motor voter” provisions of the NVRA, which require states
to offer eligible voters the opportunity to register to vote while applying for or
renewing their driver licenses.198 Despite the clear federal directive requiring state
compliance, a 2014 Pew Charitable Trust Study revealed that state agencies often fail
to make voter registration materials available to individuals who visit DMV offices.199
The Pew Study noted that “[i]n most states, motor vehicles and elections are
administered by separate agencies with very different missions and little obvious
incentive to cooperate.”200 The authors concluded that “with limited enforcement of
the law, many motor vehicle agencies have seen little reason to allocate scarce time
and money to meet this responsibility.” 201
The problem of state and local noncompliance can be reduced if the federal
government takes a more active role in NVRA enforcement and oversight. As
Weinstein-Tull rightly points out, “[l]egislation can accomplish those ends by
providing the federal government with stronger oversight tools; by empowering states
to manage their local governments; and by allowing local governments to modestly
tailor the administration of the law to their jurisdictions.”
But until Congress embraces these sensible reforms, and the states abide by them,
voters will need legal theories to vindicate their rights in the post-Husted world. The
Due Process Clause may offer voter-rights advocates a way to meet that challenge.
V. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Since the 1960s, most plaintiffs challenging state restrictions on voting rights have
based their claims on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 202
The 1966 case of Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections played a key role in the rise
of equal protection claims by disenfranchised voters.203 In Harper, the U.S. Supreme
Court struck down Virginia’s $1.50 poll tax on grounds it violated the Equal Protection
Clause.204 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas declared that “the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains the States from fixing voter
qualifications which invidiously discriminate.”205
Equal protection analysis lays at the heart of cases as diverse as the presidential
election controversy in Bush v. Gore206 and the Voter ID dispute in Crawford v.
Marion County Election Board.207 To resolve equal protection claims in voting rights
cases, the Supreme Court developed a test known as the “Anderson-Burdick balancing
198

Id. at 755.

199

Measuring Motor Voter, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 2 (May
https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2014/05/06/measuringmotorvoter.pdf.
200

Id.

201

Id.

2014),

202 Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 671 (1966) (holding that “the right to vote
is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned” by a poll tax).
203

Id. at 666.

204

Id. at 664.

205

Id. at 666.

206

Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000).

207

Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 207 (2008).
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test.”208 Named after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Anderson v Celebrezze209 and
Burdick v Takushi,210 the Anderson-Burdick test requires courts to balance the state’s
regulatory interests in defending its election law against the burden the law imposes
on voters.211 But in Anderson, the Court emphasized that “the state’s important
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions.”212 Moreover, in Burdick the Court pointedly observed that “[e]lection
laws will invariably impose some burden upon individual voters” and thus “to subject
every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling state interest . . . would tie the hands of States seeking
to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.” 213
The Anderson-Burdick test is thus highly deferential to legislative judgments, a
fact demonstrated by the Court’s ruling in Crawford to uphold Indiana’s Voter ID
law.214 Consequently, as Professor Edward Foley has persuasively argued, the Equal
Protection Clause is not a useful tool for challenging many types of voting restrictions,
such as early registration deadlines or reductions in early voting periods. 215 The
fundamental problem, Foley explains, is that “[f]or there to be an equal protection
issue requiring some level of judicial scrutiny, a state must be engaging in some sort
of differential treatment between two groups of persons.”216 But even the most
controversial election laws usually do not distinguish between groups of voters. 217 On
the surface at least, Voter ID laws, polling hours, and other restrictions on voting apply
equally to all voters.
Early registration deadlines offer a case in point. Most states do not offer sameday registration and many require voters to register thirty days in advance of Election

208 Edward B. Foley, Due Process, Fair Play, And Excessive Partisanship: A New Principle
for Judicial Review of Election Laws, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 655, 674–75 (2017) (“Over the years,
this equal-protection-for-voting jurisprudence has evolved into what is known as the ‘AndersonBurdick balancing test,’ so named after two leading cases in this long line of
precedents: Anderson v. Celebrezze and Burdick v. Takushi.”).
209

Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 780 (1983).

210

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 428 (1992).

211

Foley, supra note 208, at 675.

212

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.

213

Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.

Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204 (upholding Indiana’s Voter ID law on grounds that the state’s
interests “are both neutral and sufficiently strong to require us to reject petitioners’ facial attack
on the statute. The application of the statute to the vast majority of Indiana voters is amply
justified by the valid interest in protecting the ‘integrity and reliability of the electoral
process.’”); see also Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1836, 1847 (2013).
214

Foley, supra note 208, at 686 (“[T]here is no avoiding the conclusion that AndersonBurdick balancing is a poor doctrinal vehicle for considering the constitutionality of laws that
cut back on the availability of voting opportunities.”).
215

216

Id. at 683.

217

Id. at 684.
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Day.218 But voters who seek to challenge such laws have limited tools available
because the Equal Protection Clause offers no relief. 219 The reason, Professor Foley
points out, is because a voting law “does not differentiate among voters if it provides
all voters with exactly the same opportunity to cast a ballot.” 220 As long as a state
requires all voters to register at the same time, the Equal Protection Clause is not
implicated.
The same logic holds true in the case of voter registration purges. Take, for
example, Ohio’s Supplemental Process. It removes from the state registration list all
voters who fail to vote over a six-year period and also fail to respond to an addressconfirmation notice. Accordingly, the plaintiffs in Husted did not have a viable equal
protection claim and found themselves confined to an unsuccessful statutory
challenge.
However, the right to equal protection under law is not the only right enshrined in
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause offers an alternative basis for
plaintiffs in voting rights cases.221 Due process is a cornerstone principle of the rule of
law. As the Supreme Court emphasized in the famous case of International Shoe v.
Washington, due process requires “fair play and substantial justice.” 222 Although
International Shoe arose from a Washington court’s assertion of specific personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, the due process principles it articulated
have direct relevance to voting rights cases. 223 As Professor Foley explains:
A purely partisan change of voting procedures, designed to ‘unlevel’ the
playing field between the opposing parties, is a breach of the norm of fair
play as applied to the domain of electoral competition. Consequently, if the
judiciary encounters a partisan change in voting procedures of this nature,
the appropriate judicial response is to invalidate the change as a breach of
the norm of fair play embedded within the Due Process Clause. 224
Although Professor Foley’s argument focuses on the due process principle of fair
play, his reasoning applies equally well to the due process principle of notice. In
Husted, the fundamental problem with Ohio’s Supplemental Process was the
218

Id. at 683.

Id. (“Many states besides Ohio and North Carolina currently offer no option of
registering and voting at the same time. Instead, all of these states require voters to register in
advance (often thirty days in advance) before the thus-registered voter casts a ballot in the
election, whether early or on Election Day itself. No one considers this conventional
arrangement an equal protection problem.”).
219

220

Id. at 684.

Id. at 738 (“[J]udicial review of curtailments of voting opportunities under due process
could potentially play a meaningful role in protecting voters from inappropriately partisan
legislation.”).
221

222

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

Foley, supra note 208, at 692 (“None of these many cases, either civil or criminal, in
which the Supreme Court has linked due process with fair play specifically concerns the
regulation of the electoral process. That fact, however, is no barrier to such linkage in the future.
. . . Indeed, there already have been hints of this use of fair play in cases concerning the
procedures that the government uses to count votes.”).
223

224

Id. at 739.
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inadequate notice provided to voters placed on the inactive list. Such voters only
received a single address-confirmation notice from Ohio election authorities. As
discussed above in Section IV, many voters may simply overlook a postcard notice
amid the junk mail that increasingly fills Americans’ mailboxes. Indeed, according to
the U.S. Postal Service, advertising appeals now constitute half of all U.S. Mail,225 a
significant portion of which is never opened or read.226 If an inactive voter
inadvertently disposes of the address-confirmation notice along with the mountain of
junk mail that the typical voter receives on a daily basis, the voter will not know that
their registration status is in jeopardy.
An eligible voter who does not receive adequate notice of their removal from state
voting rolls has suffered a cognizable injury under the Due Process Clause. The U.S.
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that notice is a core requirement of due
process.227 As the Supreme Court famously observed in Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., “[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” 228 The Court has repeatedly
reaffirmed that point.229 In a 1993 takings case, the Court declared that “[t]he right to
prior notice and a hearing is central to the Constitution’s command of due process.”230
Without adequate notice to all interested parties, the truth-seeking function of the
judicial system is undermined. As Justice Felix Frankfurter once observed, “[n]o better
instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of
serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.” 231
The U.S. Supreme Court closely examined the notice required by the Due Process
Clause in the 1982 case of Greene v. Lindsey.232 The case arose from a Kentucky state
225 Ron Nixon, Seeking Revenue, Postal Service Plans to Deliver More Junk Mail, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 9, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/business/seeking-revenue-postalservice-plans-to-deliver-more-junk-mail.html (“About 48 percent of the mail is advertising
appeals, according to Postal Service data. Last year, Americans received about 84 billion pieces
of junk mail.”).
226

Rowley, supra note 148.

United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993) (“Our precedents
establish the general rule that individuals must receive notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the Government deprives them of property.”).
227

228

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).

229 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972) (emphasizing that the right to notice and a
hearing “is no new principle of constitutional law. The right to a prior hearing has long been
recognized by this Court under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. Although the Court has
held that due process tolerates variances in the form of a hearing ‘appropriate to the nature of
the case,’ and ‘depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the
subsequent proceedings (if any), the Court has traditionally insisted that, whatever its form,
opportunity for that hearing must be provided before the deprivation at issue takes effect.”)
(quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313, and Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971)).
230

James Daniel, 510 U.S. at 53.

231

Joint Anti–Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170–172 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
232

Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 451 (1982).
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law permitting landlords to post eviction proceeding notices on their tenants’
apartment doors.233 But the facts in the record showed that children often took down
the notices.234 In Greene the Supreme Court ruled that Kentucky’s notice procedures
failed to satisfy due process. 235 In striking down the state law, the justices articulated
a standard for judging whether a notice procedure satisfies the requirements of the Due
Process Clause:
The sufficiency of notice must be tested with reference to its ability to
inform people of the pendency of proceedings that affect their interests. In
arriving at the constitutional assessment, we look to the realities of the case
before us: In determining the constitutionality of a procedure established
by the State to provide notice in a particular class of cases, its effect must
be judged in the light of its practical application to the affairs of men as
they are ordinarily conducted.236
A single postcard mailer does not meet that test. In a busy world where most
communication occurs online, due process requires that election authorities make
more than a lone effort to communicate with inactive voters through the U.S. mail.
The fundamental constitutional right to vote should not be forfeited because a voter
overlooked a single postcard.237
To be sure, an important caveat must be added. In Greene, the Court described the
U.S. Mail as an adequate form of notice, holding that “notice by mail may reasonably
be relied upon to provide interested persons with actual notice of judicial
proceedings.”238 In reaching that conclusion, the Court asserted that “the mails provide
an ‘efficient and inexpensive means of communication,’ upon which prudent men will
ordinarily rely in the conduct of important affairs.” 239
But the Supreme Court made that determination in 1982,240 an era before email,
texting, and the worldwide web. At the time of the Greene case, Americans naturally
paid close attention to traditional mail, which was the dominant means by which
consumers received and paid their bills. 241 The world has changed dramatically in the
233

Id. at 453–54.

Id. at 453 (“As the process servers were well aware, notices posted on apartment doors
in the area where these tenants lived were ‘not infrequently’ removed by children or other
tenants before they could have their intended effect.”).
234

Id. at 456 (“We conclude that in failing to afford appellees adequate notice of the
proceedings against them before issuing final orders of eviction, the State has deprived them of
property without the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
235

236

Id. at 451 (quoting North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925)).

237
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (“[T]he right to vote is too
precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned”).
238

Greene, 456 U.S. at 455.

239

Id.

240

Id.

241 James Gattuso, Can the Postal Service Have a Future?, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 10,
2013) (“[A]bout 6.8 billion pieces are bill payments from consumers to businesses. But the
practice of sending checks in the mail is being abandoned as Americans are becoming
increasingly comfortable with paying their bills online. As late as 2002, 75 percent of all bills

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

31

516

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:485

intervening years. In the three and a half decades since Greene, email, texting, social
media, and online bill paying have long since surpassed the U.S. Mail as the primary
means of communication in the United States.242 For example, in 2002 about 75% of
all bills were paid by traditional mail and only 17% online. 243 But by 2012 the
percentage of bills paid electronically had risen to 56%. 244
Email in particular has become the preferred method of written communication. 245
As a 2013 report by the Heritage Foundation pointed out, “[t]he market for traditional
mail has been shrinking rapidly, as Americans have fled ‘snail mail’ in favor of
electronic alternatives.”246 As electronic communication has become central to
American society, first-class mail volume has plummeted from 103 billion pieces of
mail delivered in 2001 to only fifty-eight billion in 2017.247 The U.S. Postal Service
lost $65 billion between 2007 and 2018.248 Meanwhile, junk mail has soared as a
percentage of U.S. Mail, which is no accident.249 As discussed above, the Postal
Service has actively solicited junk mail from businesses in a desperate effort to shore

were paid by mail and only 17 percent were paid electronically. In 2012, by contrast, the Postal
Service reports that 56 percent of bills were paid electronically and only 40 percent by mail.”),
https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/report/can-the-postal-service-have-future.
242

See Devin Leonard, NEITHER SNOW NOR RAIN: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
POSTAL SERVICE (2016); Frank Newport, The New Era of Communication Among Americans,
GALLUP (Nov. 10, 2014), https://news.gallup.com/poll/179288/new-era-communicationamericans.aspx.
243

Gattuso, supra note 241.

244

Id.

Hank H. Cox, From the Pony Express to ‘Going Postal,’ the History and Lore of
Delivering
the
Mail,
WASH.
POST
(July
7,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/from-the-pony-express-to-going-postal-thehistory-and-lore-of-delivering-the-mail/2016/07/07/ac8af3da-ef8c-11e5-85a62132cf446d0a_story.html?utm_term=.760b5cdfb40f (“[M]odern technology such as email has
superseded much of the U.S. Postal Service’s traditional work, raising serious questions about
its viability.”).
245

246

Gattuso, supra note 241.

247

First Class Mail Volume Since 1926, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERV. (March 2018),
https://about.usps.com/who-we-are/postal-history/first-class-mail-since-1926.pdf;
Gattuso,
supra note 241.
Chris Isidore, Postal Service Losses Soar to $1.3 billion, but Don’t Blame Amazon, CNN
(May
11,
2018),
https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/11/news/companies/postal-servicelosses/index.html.
248

249 Kevin O’Marah, Can Amazon Save the Post Office?, FORBES (April 12, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinomarah/2018/04/12/can-amazon-save-the-postoffice/#1f96c0512bc3.
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up its budget woes.250 By any measure, the U.S. Postal Service simply no longer plays
the prominent role in American life that it once did.251
The upshot is Americans no longer pay the same close attention to standard mail
that they once did. Consequently, a single address-confirmation notice sent via the
junk mail-clogged U.S. Postal Service is a far less effective way to convey notice than
would have been the case in 1982. The constitutional test for due process was
articulated by the Supreme Court in Mullane: “notice reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.” 252 Thus, the requirements of due
process must change as communication habits evolve. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged as much in many cases. For example, it has held that due process is
“flexible and calls for such procedural safeguards as the situation demands” 253 and it
has repeatedly emphasized that the “notice required will vary with circumstances and
conditions.”254
Accordingly, in more recent years, the Supreme Court held that even service by
certified mail may not satisfy due process.255 In the 2006 case of Jones v. Flowers, a
taxpayer alleged that Arkansas failed to provide sufficient notice before seizing his
property for a tax sale. 256 The Supreme Court agreed257 and held that “when mailed
notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, the State must take additional reasonable
steps to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before selling his property, if
it is practicable to do so.”258 The Court further held that a “reasonable step” for
Arkansas to have taken was “to resend the notice by regular mail, so that a signature
was not required.”259

250 Ron Nixon, Seeking Revenue, Postal Service Plans to Deliver More Junk Mail, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 9, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/20/business/seeking-revenue-postalservice-plans-to-deliver-more-junk-mail.html.
251 Veronica Stracqualursi, Postal Service Reports $3.9 Billion in Losses for Fiscal Year
2018, CNN (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/15/politics/postal-service-lossesfiscal-year-2018/index.html; Steve Pociask, A Failed Mission: U.S. Postal Service Details
Another
Massive
Loss
for
the
2017
Fiscal
Year,
FORBES
(2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevepociask/2017/11/14/a-failed-mission-u-s-postal-servicedetails-another-massive-loss-for-the-2017-fiscal-year/#624ae93d7f79.
252

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).

253

Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972)).
254 Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956) (holding that newspaper
publication of condemnation proceedings was inadequate under the circumstances).
255

Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 235 (2006).

Id. at 224 (“Jones filed a lawsuit in Arkansas state court against the Commissioner and
Flowers, alleging that the Commissioner's failure to provide notice of the tax sale and of Jones’
right to redeem resulted in the taking of his property without due process.”).
256

257

Id. at 225.

258

Id.

259

Id. at 234.
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Most interesting of all, the Supreme Court in Flowers approvingly noted that
“[m]any States already require in their statutes that the government do more than
simply mail notice to delinquent owners,” further noting that such states engage in
“follow up” communications with owners “if initial mailed notice is ineffective.” 260
Yet, when it comes to protecting the fundamental right to vote, states like Ohio do not
engage in follow up communications with inactive voters. Ohio election officials do
nothing more than simply mail notice in the form of a single postcard. 261 If a single
mailed notice is not sufficient in the context of a tax sale, it should not be sufficient in
the context of voter disenfranchisement either.
Two recent cases suggest that the courts may be receptive to due process
arguments brought by disenfranchised voters. In August 2018, a New Hampshire
federal court struck down on due process grounds a state voting requirement that
barred 275 absentee ballots from being counted during the 2016 election. 262 The case
of Saucedo v. Gardner arose from a New Hampshire state law requiring signatures on
absentee ballots to match the signatures on absentee ballot applications. 263 But
absentee voters received no notice that their signature would be compared with another
signature.264 The only way absentee voters could learn of their ballot’s rejection was
by consulting the Secretary of State’s website, and even then, the notice only came
after the election.265
The federal court in Saucedo granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and
struck down the signature match law on due process grounds. 266 The judge put
particular weight on the fact that election administrators received “no training in
handwriting analysis or signature comparison” and state law provided no “functional
standards to distinguish the natural variations of one writer from other variations that
suggest two different writers.” 267 The state’s failure to provide adequate notice of the
rejected absentee ballots also factored in the court’s decision. 268 By the time the case
reached the court in 2018, New Hampshire had amended its election law to require
260

Id. at 228.

Catherine Candisky, Inactive Ohio Voters Sent ‘Last-Chance’ Notice Before Purge, THE
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.dispatch.com/news/20190109/inactive-ohiovoters-sent-last-chance-notices-before-purge.
261

262

Saucedo v. Gardner, 335 F. Supp. 3d 202, 206 (D.N.H. 2018).

263

Id.

264 Id. at 207 (“What is most relevant here is that the application requires the voter to sign
her name. Prior to and in the 2016 General Election, there was no notice on the application that
the application signature would be compared with another signature; instead, below the
signature line was the following statement: ‘Voter must sign to receive an absentee ballot.’”).
265
Id. at 209 (“[N]o formal notice of rejection is sent to the voter after Election Day. Rather,
after the election, a voter may determine whether and why her absentee ballot was rejected via
a website maintained by the Secretary of State.”).
266 Id. at 222 (“Therefore, in light of the undisputed, material facts in the record, plaintiffs
are entitled to summary judgment on their procedural due process claim.”).
267

Id. at 206.

268 Id. at 222 (“But taken as a whole, and in light of the fundamental importance of the right
to vote, the current process for rejecting voters due to a signature mismatch fails to guarantee
basic fairness.”).
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advanced notice of the signature match requirement in future elections.269 But that was
still not good enough in the judge’s view. In her ruling, the judge pointed out that the
amended law did not change the fact that “the voter is not even given notice that her
ballot has been rejected due to a signature mismatch.”270 The court concluded,
therefore, that “in light of the fundamental importance of the right to vote, the current
process for rejecting voters due to a signature mismatch fails to guarantee basic
fairness.”271 As the court explained, the law gave rise to an unacceptably high “risk
that qualified voters are wrongly disenfranchised” and minor refinements would be
insufficient to remedy the flaws in the signature-match process.272
The 2018 Georgia gubernatorial election also saw a successful due process
challenge brought by disenfranchised voters.273 In the weeks before the election, the
state rejected hundreds of absentee ballots and absentee ballot applications due to
alleged signature mismatches.274 In Martin v. Kemp, a federal court enjoined
enforcement of Georgia’s signature match law because the state had failed to provide
adequate due process protections. 275 Much like the Saucedo case, the judge ruled that
it was a violation of due process for “a single election official . . . not trained in
handwriting analysis” to exercise “unchecked discretion to determine whether two
signatures match.”276 As the court explained, “[h]aving created an absentee voter
regime through which qualified voters can exercise their fundamental right to vote,
the State must now provide absentee voters with constitutionally adequate due process
protection.”277
There are potential lessons here that apply to the Husted case. As Justice Alito
explained in the majority opinion, Husted only presented “a question of statutory
interpretation.”278 The case thus turned solely on the NVRA’s notice requirements, not
the notice requirements of constitutional due process. But had the plaintiffs brought a
due process challenge, rather than just a statutory challenge, it is possible they might
have encountered more success with the Court. To be sure, due process claims face a
high bar. As the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge noted, “procedural due process
269 Id. at 207 (noting that “as a result of amendments to the absentee-ballot statutory scheme
in 2017, the application now contains the following statement below the signature line: ‘The
applicant must sign this form to receive an absentee ballot. The signature on this form must
match the signature on the affidavit envelope in which the absentee ballot is returned, or the
ballot may be rejected.’”).
270

Id. at 206.

271

Id. at 222.

272

Id.

273

Martin v. Kemp, 341 F. Supp. 3d 1326, 1341 (N.D. Ga. 2018).

274

Id. at 1331.

275 Id. at 1339 (“While the Court recognizes that the risk of an erroneous deprivation is by
no means enormous, permitting an absentee voter to resolve an alleged signature discrepancy
nevertheless has the very tangible benefit of avoiding disenfranchisement.”), id. at 1341
(“Plaintiffs have shown they are entitled to an injunction on the signature mismatch issue”).
276

Id.

277

Id. at 1338.

278

Husted v. A. Philips Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1848 (2018).
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rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to
the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.”279 But the facts of Husted made clear
the plaintiffs were not “rare exceptions” to the “generality of cases.” 280 The record
showed that over one million Ohioans failed to respond to address-confirmation
notices, which removed any doubt that the risk of error created by the Supplemental
Process was general in nature, and not limited to “rare exceptions.” 281
It remains to be seen how the U.S. Supreme Court would respond to due process
arguments in the context of a voter registration purge such as that at issue in Husted.282
But the plaintiffs’ success in the Saucedo and Kemp cases suggests that we might be
in the early stages of a new era in election law jurisprudence. The bottom line is the
states have an obligation to do more than simply go through the motions of providing
due process. As the Supreme Court explained in Mullane, “when notice is a person’s
due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process. The means employed must be
such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to
accomplish it.”283
The conclusion seems clear: when election authorities provide notice in the form
of a single address-confirmation postcard, the state is engaged in nothing more than a
mere gesture of compliance with due process. The Constitution requires more than
that. Full and robust notice in the form of multiple mailings using a range of
communication mediums—including email, texts, and social media—can and should
be employed by state elections officials before they remove inactive voters from the
voting rolls. Courts and plaintiffs should demand nothing less from state election
officials than full compliance with the requirements of due process.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF VOTING RIGHTS
When adopted in 1993, the NVRA represented a major advance. It expanded
registration options for voters, and it required states to incorporate an addressconfirmation notice as part of their list maintenance procedures. Ohio’s Supplemental
Process complies with the NVRA and thus the majority in Husted reached the right
result as a matter of law. But serious shortcomings nevertheless remain in the addressconfirmation system. Accordingly, Congress should amend the NVRA to prevent state
list maintenance programs from wrongfully removing eligible voters from the voting
rolls.
In the meantime, when faced with overzealous voter registration purges, plaintiffs
and courts should expand their constitutional horizons. In Mullane, the Supreme Court
observed that the Due Process Clause requires “notice reasonably calculated, under all
279

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976).

280

Id.

281

Husted, 138 S. Ct. at 1856 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (holding that “the specific dictates of due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.”).
282

283

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
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the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.”284 In the email age, when unsolicited
advertisements and other forms of junk mail have become an ever larger share of the
U.S. Mail, a single postcard-sized notice is no longer “notice reasonably calculated
under the circumstances” to inform voters of their pending removal from the
registration lists. Accordingly, until Congress improves the NVRA, the Due Process
Clause offers inactive voters a promising option for preserving their voting rights.

284

Id.
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